special issues

«Global Europe»: An Initial Assessment of the European Commission’s New Trade Policy
Simon J. Evenett
The principal elements of the European Commission’s recent Communication on its external trade policy (titled “Global Europe”) are assessed in this paper. Certain shifts are discernible in the Commission's position, in particular as they relate to the prominence given to market access objectives and to bilateral and regional trade agreements. Even so, this latest Communication is probably best thought of as an evolution in the Commission's trade policy and not an abrupt break with the past. Particular attention is given here to the potential payoffs from the proposed bilateral trade negotiations with selected Asian nations and the need for further thinking on the Commission's part with respect to the multilateral trading system.

Global Europe: Old Mercantilist Wine in New Bottles?
Jim Rollo
This paper analyses the European Commission’s Communication Global Europe and attempts to demonstrate that the substance behind the shift in emphasis towards bilateral trade policy is an extension of existing EU bilateral trade policy; that the shift is not convincingly justified by the analysis in the EU Commission papers; that the shift might be best thought of as an attempt to re-energise corporate sector support for trade liberalisation in the face of the suspension of the Doha Development Agenda and a weakening of political support for trade liberalisation.

The European Commission’s Communication on External Policy: A U.S. Perspective
Claude Barfield
This essay will present the views of a US observer on the politics and substance of the European Commission's proposed new policies toward bilateral and regional trade agreements. It will contrast both the rationale advanced by the Commission and the underlying politics surrounding FTAs with the situations in the United States, particularly the record of the BUSH administration “Competitive Liberalisation” policy. It will also describe additional political and security considerations that form the basis for US regional trade policy. Finally, it will advance tentative predictions for the FTA policy in the future.

The EU’s New Trade Strategy and Regionalisation in the World Economy
P. J. Lloyd and Donald MacLaren
The “new generation of Free Trade Agreements” announced by the Commission of the European Community signals an intention to substantially extend the geographic coverage of its reciprocal, preferential trade agreements. We review the development of regionalism in East Asia by listing the existing bilaterals and those under negotiation and conclude that the EC’s initiative will have minimal effect in this region. However, globally, there are two super-hubs, namely the EC and the US, each with its network of spokes and associated rules. They are likely to compete to design any new multilateral rules which are WTO-plus.

The EU New Trade Policy and the Perspectives for a EU-Mercosur Agreement
André Filipe Zago de Azevedo and RenatoAntônio Henz
This article aims to address the European Union’s new trade policy, expressed by the European Commission Communication “Global Europe: Competing in the World”, and the ongoing negotiations to form the EU-Mercosur FTA. The Communication selected Mercosur as a priority, based on two economic criteria: The market potential and the level of protection againstEU exports. Mercosur also considers such an agreement as a top priority in its agenda since it already has the EU as its main trade partner and faces many tariff and non-tariff barriers to its exports to the bloc. However, the ongoing negotiations among the two blocs that began in 1999 are still far from conclusion..

Russia’s Relations with the EU after WTOAccession
Yaroslav Lissovolik
Russia’s accession to the WTO next year will set the stage for a more active dialogue with the EU on deeper integration and trade liberalisation. In this respect the formation of a FTA with the EU is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for engaging Russia into an active dialogue on a broad range of political and economic issues. Other modalities of trade liberalisation, including regional cooperation and greater openness to investment would also need to be addressed. The delays in drawing up a new comprehensive framework of EU-Russia cooperation come at a time when the need for a renewed framework is greater than ever, which calls for the speedy launching of talks on the creation of a new comprehensive PCA in the near future.

Observations on the Intellectual Property Component of the European Commission’s New Trade Policy
Keith E.Maskus
Der Artikel beschreibt und analysiert die Elemente der Rechte des geistigen Eigentums in der kürzlich angekündigten neuen EU Handelspolitik, welche in Zukunft im globalen Handel durchsetzungsfähiger sein soll. Der Schwerpunkt der neuen Handelsstrategie liegt auf der Verstärkung der globalen Harmonisierung, der Einführung von stärkeren Standards in bilateralen Freihandelsabkommen und der verstärkten Durchsetzung der Rechte in den wichtigsten Entwicklungsländern. Diese Strategie stimmt grösstenteils überein mit der Art und Weise, wie die Rechte des geistigen Eigentums in der globalen und bilateralen Handelspolitik der USA gewichtet werden, deren Bilanz jedoch unterschiedlich ausfällt. Aus dieser Bilanz werden Schlüsse gezogen, um die möglichen Gewinne und Probleme zu erläutern, die in der neuen EU Handelspolitik auftreten könnten.

1. Part I: Horizontal Interaction
   
   Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit
   Georg Tsebelis
   The chapter compares the power of the different institutional actors of the EU (Council Commission and European Parliament) under the cooperation and codecision procedures. A series of spatial models enables the reader to evaluate the influence of each one of these three actors in the legislative process. The conclusions are that: 1. The Commission's power to set the agenda is unambiguously reduced by codecision. 2. The relationship between Council and Parliament becomes more ambiguous, since the ability of the EP to affect institutional decisions increases (through the veto power introduced by the codecision procedure), but its ability to influence policy decisions (through conditional agenda setting introduced by the cooperation procedure) is reduced. The paper makes the prediction that the role of the European Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes between the Council and the EP will be reduced, because each one of these actors has now the power to block European decisionmaking independently, and so, resolve the disputes politically.
   
   The Benefits of the Conciliation Procedure for the European Parliament: Comment to George Tsebelis
   Peter Moser 
   [to be added]
   
   Policy Making and Commission Appointment in the European Union
   Christophe Crombez
   The author presents spatial models of Commission appointment and EU policy making. The theory characterizes sets of effective Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, and sets of successful proposals, i.e., proposals that can become EU policy. It also determines equilibrium EU Commissions and policies. The paper focuses on the Commission's role in EU policy making and discusses how recent institutional developments have affected its powers. It concludes that the Parliament's increased role in Commission appointment and policy making has limited the sets of effective Commissions and the sets of successful proposals.
   
   The Commission as a Pawn to the Member Countries: Comment to Christophe Crombez
   Simon Hug
   [to be added]
   
   Beyond comitology: a comparative analysis of implementation procedures with parliamentary involvement
   Bernhard Steunenberg, Christian Kobold and Dieter Schmidtchen
   While the European Parliament currently plays an important role in the European legislative process, it is not yet involved in the decision making process on the implementation of measures. The Council still plays a dominant role at this stage of the European policy making process. Based on the current decision making procedures, which are commonly known as 'comitology', the Council and thereby the member states are allowed to review the Commission's execution of Community acts. In this paper we propose and analyze two alternative implementation procedures, which may strengthen the role of Parliament. The policies which these procedures may produce are compared with those of current procedures. Moreover, we show how the institutional balance in the Union would change if the alternative procedures were implemented.
   
   Redistribution and the Power Struggle within the European Union: Comment to Bernhard Steunenberg, Christian Kobold and Dieter Schmidtchen
   Gerald Schneider
   [to be added]
    
2. Part II: Vertical Integration
   
   European Union Power and Regional Involvement: A Case Study of the Political Implications of the Reform of the Structural Funds for Ireland
   Diane Payne, Robert Mokken and Frans Stokman
   The Reform of the Structural Funds process in Ireland, has the potential over time, to curtail the power of the national central public authorities, while increasing the political effectiveness of other actors. This policy process comprises a chain of collective decision making processes around important issues. These issues belong to different policy arenas, called the national and subnational policy arenas. The policy outcomes in the different arenas are determined by the interplay of stakeholders with varying capabilities, policy preferences and saliences. Subnational level actors in Ireland, have become more effective over time in the subnational policy arena, but remain excluded from the national policy arena. However, the European Commission Directorate General XVI for Regional policy has emerged over time, as the most central actor in both arenas.
   
   The Role of the Regions and the 'Partnership Principle' in the Structural Policy,Comment to Diane Payne, Robert Mokken and Frans Stokman
   René Buholzer
   [to be added]
   
   Political Accountability in an Economic and Monetary Union
   Susanne Lohmann
   When states form a political union, the responsibility for economic policy outcomes - inflation and output growth - is diffused across multiple policymakers. As a result, the contributions made by individual policymakers are subject to less intense voter scrutiny. This article examines the policy and welfare consequences of reduced political accountability. I show that the average quality of policymakers is lower in a political union. However, their incentive to manipulate monetary policy is reduced in a union. Therefore, positive effects on welfare are possible.
   
   Political Pressures on the Future European Central Bank: Comment to Susanne Lohmann
   Robert Holzmann
   [to be added]
   
   Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis
   Patrick Dunleavy
   The progressive centralization of the European Union is analysed using an array of public choice models, operating at the levels of social forces and institutional actors, and covering both the supply of centralization and the demand for it. The 'triple state thesis' argues that largescale business systematically seeks to insulate decisions of key importance for profit levels from electoral scrutiny. A welfaremaximizing approach argues that European citizens have accepted changes in the level at which decisions are made in order to accomplish goals more efficiently, by matching institutional scales to problem characteristics. In the bureaushaping model, EU bureaucrats have played a key role by wanting to deliver centralization while maintaining a minimal organizational apparatus. And the transaction costs account sets out why member state governments have incentives to delegate (partial) powers upwards, in order to achieve deniability for tough decisions and to facilitate otherwise difficult precommitments. Two key implications flow from the overall analysis: the drift to Brussels' is likely to continue; and the EU's 'democratic deficit' will be a permanent feature of institutional arrangements.
   
   Supply and Demand Factors of Centralization, Comment to Patrick Dunleavy
   Gebhard Kirchgässner
   [to be added]
    
3. Part III: Discussions of Selected Reform Proposals
   
   Government Formation in the European Parliament
   Michael Laver
   This chapter looks at some political implications of a potential institutional reform in the EU - giving the European Parliament the power to choose a political executive for the Union. It applies two different models of government formation - the dynamic model of protocoalition formation, and the portfolio allocation model - and implements these using party positions derived from an expert survey. Whichever model is used, the conclusions are that members of the liberal party group would be in the pivotal position in the consequent government formation process. This conclusion holds even if what is at present quite a diverse group, in terms of the policy positions of member parties, were to be reduced to its ideological "core" members as a result of the politics of government formation.
   
   Should the European Parliament be Given the Power to Elect the Commission? Comment to Michael Laver
   Dennis C. Mueller
   [to be added]
   
   The Power of Political Parties in the Institutions of the European Union
   Josep M. Colomer and Madeleine O. Hösli
   Voting power analyses as applied to the European Union (EU) have usually focused on a single institution, such as the Council of the EU or the European Parliament (EP) and measure a priori voting power, valid over longer time spans and assuming several coalitions between members to be likely, rather than the distribution of power at a specific point of time. This paper attempts to demonstrate how "actual voting power" can be assessed on the basis of two modifications: (1) the paper provides an overall index of voting power for political parties as re-presented in the institutions of the EU, mainly the Council and the EP; (2) for the case of the EP - in contrast to the Council - it is assumed that only "connected coalitions" form and power in the Council is assumed to be sha-red by the respective domestic governing parties. Technically, the analysis is based on a modification of the (normalized) Banzhaf power index. Under this approach, the national government parties in the five largest EU member states - Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain - are found to be the most powerful political actors within the EU institutions as of present. For the situation at the end of 1996, this is especially true for the British Conservatives, the German Christian-Democrats and the Spanish Popular Party. In addition, the British Labour Party and the Forza Italia, two major national opposition parties, appear to be particularly power-ful in negotiating a political majority within the EU institutions.
   
   The Power Index Method and the European Union: Comment to Josep M. Colomer and Madeleine O. Hösli
   Jan-Erik Lane, Sven Berg and Reinert Maeland
   [to be added]
   
   Integration through Referendums?
   Simon Hug
   Instruments of direct democracy have been considered both as hurdles to integration and as facilitating factors for integration. In the context of European Integration referendums are even envisioned as possible solutions to the "democratic deficit." The insights from the literature on referendums do not allow, however, the role of direct democracy in processes of integration to be judged. In the present paper I explore with game theoretic tools the likely consequences of ratification referendums in an integration process. I show that referendums are likely to increase the legitimity of decisions but that the leeway for treaty revisions becomes smaller and integration may become more fragmented.
   
   Referenda ('Voice') and Tiebout Competition ('Exit') As Means of Integration? Comment to Simon Hug
   Lars P. Feld

1. Part I: Integration Theory between Nation and Federation
   
   Legitimacy: The Missing Link for Explaining EU-Institution Building
   Heinz Hauser und Alexia Müller
   In this article shall the legitimization problems of the EU be shown in order to prepare consciously the institutional reforms of 1996. The organization of the EU is as well intergovernmental as supranational, this is why the European integration does not correspond to any traditional integration theory. The main problem is in the distribution of competencies between the national and the EU-level. The EU disposes about a power, which is not justified under legitimization aspects. The main legitimization criteria is the citizen participation, but especially under this aspect the EU does not fulfill the legitimization criteria, this is shown also in the Maastricht
   judgment. Possible solutions could be the 'integration à géométrie variable', the subsidiarity principle or on a institutional base the 'markets preserving federalism'. 
   
   
   Federal Balance and the Problem of Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union
   Rudolf Hrbek
   The article explores in the light of integration theory approaches - aiming at explaining characteristic features and structural components of the EU and the integration process - the EU as emerging political system. The EU system, as multi - level system, is confronted with the problem, to establish and maintain a federal balance. The article, therefore, discusses the contribution of the Principle of Subsidiarity and the role of regions and their activities in this respect. Finally, the article deals with one aspect of the legitimacy problem, which is related to institutional reforms of the EU system. Comments of Klaus Armingeon: The Democratic Deficit of the European Union.
    
2. Part II: Social Regulation and Market Integration 
   
   The Development of Social Regulation in the European Community: Policy Externalities, Transaction Costs, Motivational Factors
   Giandomenico Majone 
   This paper argues that a transaction-cost approach to EC policy making can explain the willingness of the member states to delegate important regulatory powers to supranational institutions, even where such delegation is not required by the functional needs of the single European market. According to Coase theorem, absent transaction costs, negative externalities such as transboundary pollution could be managed by decentralized (intergovernmental) agreements. However, such agreements lack credibility when the contractual partners mistrust each other and behave opportunistically. Centralization is a response to the problems of contractual incompleteness, but the paper suggests that it is not the only, much less the best, response.. In addition, by considering the dynamics of the post-delegation phase we can show how the European Commission is able, under some conditions, to play the role of a policy entrepreneur. 
   
   
   Social Regulation and Market Integration: A Critique and Public-Choice Analysis of the Social Chapter
   Roland Vaubel
   Social regulation restricts the freedom of contract and ignores differences in individual demand and supply. This is especially serious in an international organisation like the European Union where income differentials are very large. It is shown that social arrangements and preferences in the member countries are significantly correlated with the income level.The view that international differences in social regulations necessarily distort competition is false. Even those who are concerned about the prospect of deregulatory competition in the wake of the internal market programme have no reason for advocating an approximation of social regulation. The European Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice have a vested interest in European social regulation. This is also true for the governments and producers of the highly regulated member countries. The strategy of raising rivals' costs may also explain why the British government opted out from the Social Chapter instead of vetoing it. The decisive voter in the Council is determined for various social regulations. But the suppression of the less regulated member countries will also raise regulation in the decisive member state. The less regulated member states have assented to the Social Chapter because they were promised additional transfers, participation in European monetary policy making etc. and because the internal market has raised the demand for labour and the rent-maximising level of real labour cost which trade unions and median voters in these countries aim at.
    
3. Part III: Institutional Implications of European Security 
   
   The Integration of European Security: A Functionalist Analysis
   Jürg Martin Gabriel 
   In the introduction, the main concerns of the article are introduced: Is European integration temporary or permanent and irreversible ? Can European integration be extended to the field of security ? The argument is developed in two sections: part 1 examines the theoretical foundations for a possible integration of European security, drawing from the insights of functionalist and neofunctionalist integration theory and differentiating between different security functions. Part 2 applies functionalist thinking to different emerging areas of European security cooperation and integration. The main argument is that the functionalist pull provided by interdependence and the political push applied through recurrent intergovernmental bargains provides the driving force for continuing integration in the security field, a process believed to be fundamentally analogous to integration in the areas of technology and economics. The conclusions emphasize the fact that the functionalist integration mechanism functions best within those security functions closest to economics
   
   WEU and Future European Security Arrangements
   Comments of Richard Tibbels
   [to be added]
    
4. Part IV: Constitutionalizing the European Union 
   
   How can the European Union be Constitutionalized ? The European Parliament's 1994 Proposal for a ´Constitution for the European Union`
   Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
   This essay begins with a brief explanation of why the existing "treaty constitution" of the European Union (= EU) needs to be revised and codified in a simpler and shorter document (I). It then outlines premises of a "constitutional theory" of European integration and discusses, from the perspective of international relations theories, prospects of creating political support for constitutional reforms of the EU (II). The following chapter summarizes and discusses the proposal for a "European Constitution" submitted by the European Parliament in its 1994 "Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union" (III). Chapter IV outlines proposals for strengthening the "external judicial control" of EC law through a system of "judicial federalism". Chapter V concludes with constitutional reform proposals, based on a "public choice perspective", for the 1996 conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (= TEU) so as to better protect democracy in the EU and a "foreign policy constitution" that promotes respect for international law. 
   
   
   Basic Aspects of a European Constitution
   Martin Seidel 
   The article analyses basic questions of constitutionalizing the European Union. The analysis is orientated at the draft Constitution of the European Parliament of February 1994. The European Community has a constitution; it exercises its competences according to the principle of limited authorization and within a system of division of powers. Therefore, behind the demand for a constitution, there is the idea to create a new federal power and to restructure the European Union into an federal state. The draft Constitution of the European Parliament does not meet this need for a reform. Its aim restricts itself to ameliorating the existing constitution of the European Union by greater efficiency, transparency and a better democratic legitimation of the now existing decision making procedure. 
   
   
   The Shaping of a European Constitution and the 1996 IGC: 'Flexibility' as a Key Paradigm?
   Deirdre Curtin
   This article focusses on the key concept of "flexibility" in an overall constitutional framework establishing European Union. This emphasis on the need for flexibility has emerged as a central theme in many of the early contributions to the 1996 IGC. The suggestion is that the EU will, with the perspective of imminent enlargement to the East, have to work out a formula enabling member states to enjoy different classes of obligations in an attempt to accomodate many different interests and ambitions. This article examines current possibilities for differentiation within the EU and suggests possible criteria to ensure that the cohesion and institutional unity of the EU is not undermined more than strictly necessary.

1. Part I: Need of International Competition Rules
   
   Alternative Approaches for Implementing Competition Rules: In Economic Relations
   John H. Jackson 
   Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen befinden sich in einer Entwicklung in Richtung Binnenmarkt-Strukturen: Volkswirtschaften hängen zunehmend von multilateraler Kooperation ab. Dieser Trend in Richtung Interdependenz kontrastiert jedoch häufig mit fundamentalen gesellschaftlichen Unterschieden, was Bemühungen erschwert, «Marktversagen» und andere wirtschaftliche Schwierigkeiten zu lösen. «Wettbewerbspolitik» ist ein solches wirtschaftliches Anliegen. Gründliche Politikanalyse unterstreicht klar die Notwendigkeit verschiedener Kooperationsformen zwischen Regierungen auf unilateraler, bilateraler, regionaler und multilateraler Ebene. Unabhängig davon berührt Kooperation jeglicher Art eine Reihe komplizierter politischer Probleme, die sich auf Fragen der institutionellen Strukturen und der Machtverteilung beziehen. Das GATT, und darin inbegriffen die WTO, sollte wohl eine zentrale Rolle in der Suche nach Lösungen dieser politischen Probleme spielen, doch sind auch andere Möglichkeiten zu erforschen.
   
   
   Comments of Ulrich Immenga: The Failure of Present Institutions and Rules to Respond to the Globalization of Competition 
   
   Is there a Need for International Competition Rules
   Heinz Hauser und Rainer Schöne 
   Der Beitrag untersucht, ob es zur Kontrolle von restriktiven Geschäftspraktiken (RBPs) international tätiger Unternehmen einer internationalen Wettbewerbsordnung bedarf und inwieweit die heutigen rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen hierfür ausreichen. Hinsichtlich RBPs von importkonkurrierenden Unternehmen auf ihren Heimmärkten, die meist von der Regierung unterstützt werden oder zumindest behördlich geduldet werden, empfiehlt sich eine Strategie, die mit Hilfe der GATT-Regeln die Regierungsunterstützung oder -duldung angeht (non-violation complaint). Kartelle und die missbräuchliche Ausnutzung von Marktmacht lassen sich durch die Anwendung von nationalem Wettbewerbsrecht nach dem Auswirkungsprinzip durch das Importland kontrollieren, da sich es sich um marktspezifische Verhaltensweisen handelt und deshalb keine grösseren zwischenstaatlichen Konflikte zu erwarten sind. Bei Fusionen hingegen wären einerseits einheitliche internationale Standards wünschenswert, da die Auswirkungen von Fusionen nicht auf ein Land beschränkt sind. Andererseits lässt aber die ökonomische Theorie auf dem Gebiet der Fusionskontrolle so viele Fragen offen, dass es angesichts dieser grossen Unsicherheit erfolgversprechender scheint, wenn die national unterschiedlichen Fusionsstandards beibehalten werden und so ein gewisser Wettbewerb unter den Regulierungssystemen stattfindet.
   
   
   Comments of Richard Blackhurst: Competition Policies: National Versus Multilateral Juridiction 
   
   Proposals for Negotiating International Competition Rules in the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System
   Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
   Wettbewerbspolitik und Handelsliberalisierung streben beide offene Märkte und unverfälschten Wettbewerb an. Die Havanna Charta von 1948 sah daher völkerrechtliche Handels- und Wettbewerbsregeln sowohl für Staaten als auch für Unternehmen vor. Als Folge des Nicht-Inkrafttretens der Havanna Charta bestehen völkerrechtliche Wettbewerbsregeln für Unternehmen nur in bilateralen, regionalen und wenigen weltweiten Abkommen. Die verschiedenen UN- und OECD-Empfehlungen gewährleisten weder international noch national wirksame Wettbewerbsregeln. Die einseitige exterritoriale Durchsetzung von EG- und US-Wettbewerbsrecht führt immer häufiger zu internationalen Handels- und Wettbewerbskonflikten. Die Uruguay-Runde Abkommen enthalten zwar eine Vielzahl neuer Wettbewerbsregeln für Staaten und Unternehmen. Aus einer Reihe von Gründen wird die Vereinbarung zusätzlicher internationaler Wettbewerbsregeln aber eine der Hauptaufgaben der neuen Welthandelsorganisation werden. Der Beitrag stellt die vier wichtigsten verfahrens- und materiellrechtlichen Ansätze für derartige Abkommen über internationale Wettbewerbsregeln als Teil des WTO-Rechts dar.
   
    
2. Part II: Unfair Trade Practices and Competition Rules
    
   Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO System.
   Wolfgang Fikentscher 
   Von 1990 bis 1993 erarbeitete die Antitrust-Arbeitsgruppe auf freiwilliger Basis einen Entwurf für einen internationalen Antitrust-Kodex als GATT/WTO-Handelsvertrag. Dieser wurde dem GATT-Generaldirektor Peter D. Sutherland am 9. Juli 1993 vorgestellt. Der Entwurf basiert auf einer Reihe von Prinzipien, die teilweise der Pariser und der Berner Konvention zu intellektuellem Eigentum entstammen. Ein Prinzip prozeduraler Inititative, enthalten in Artikel 19 des Entwurfes, sorgt für die internationale Implementation der Regeln des Entwurfes unter GATT-Aufsicht. Ausserdem enthält der Entwurf Bestimmungen zur Kontrolle von Konzentration und Restrukturierung. Dem Entwurf unterliegt ein Wettbewerbskonzept, das sich an den praktischen Bedürfnissen des Handels orientiert.
   
   
   Comments on the Draft International Antitrust Code
   Comments of Bernard J. Philips
   Der Beitrag untersucht, ob es zur Kontrolle von restriktiven Geschäftspraktiken (RBPs) international tätiger Unternehmen einer internationalen Wettbewerbsordnung bedarf und inwieweit die heutigen rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen hierfür ausreichen. Hinsichtlich RBPs von importkonkurrierenden Unternehmen auf ihren Heimmärkten, die meist von der Regierung unterstützt werden oder zumindest behördlich geduldet werden, empfiehlt sich eine Strategie, die mit Hilfe der GATT-Regeln die Regierungsunterstützung oder -duldung angeht (non-violation complaint). Kartelle und die missbräuchliche Ausnutzung von Marktmacht lassen sich durch die Anwendung von nationalem Wettbewerbsrecht nach dem Auswirkungsprinzip durch das Importland kontrollieren, da sich es sich um marktspezifische Verhaltensweisen handelt und deshalb keine grösseren zwischenstaatlichen Konflikte zu erwarten sind. Bei Fusionen hingegen wären einerseits einheitliche internationale Standards wünschenswert, da die Auswirkungen von Fusionen nicht auf ein Land beschränkt sind. Andererseits lässt aber die ökonomische Theorie auf dem Gebiet der Fusionskontrolle so viele Fragen offen, dass es angesichts dieser grossen Unsicherheit erfolgversprechender scheint, wenn die national unterschiedlichen Fusionsstandards beibehalten werden und so ein gewisser Wettbewerb unter den Regulierungssystemen stattfindet.
   
    
3. Part III: International Code of Competition Policy 
   
   Should Antidumping Rules be replaced by National or International Competition Rules
   Patrick A. Messerlin 
   Die zunehmende Unzufriedenheit mit dem Funktionieren von Handelsgesetzen über contingent protection und insbesondere von Anti-Dumping-Regeln hat den Vorschlag zunehmend populärer gemacht, Wettbewerbsregeln auf Handelsstreitigkeiten anzuwenden. In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass die Wettbewerbspolitik der verschiedenen Länder sich so stark unterscheidet, dass ein schneller Übergang zu verwirrenden Resultaten führen würde, da nationale Wettbewerbsbehörden unterschiedliche Konzepte oder gleiche Instrumente unterschiedlich anwenden würden. Kurzfristig wäre es vorzuziehen, Antidumping- und Wettbewerbsregeln stufenweise durchzusetzen. Dies würde erlauben, wettbewerbsrechtliche Massnahmen anzudrohen, wodurch die Kosten von protektionistischen Antidumping-Massnahmen erhöht würden, ohne die Wettbewerbsbehörden zu überfordern.
   
   
    Can Competition Policy Control «301»?
   J. Michael Finger and K.C. Fung
   Dieser Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, ob rigorosere internationale Wettbewerbsstandards den von den USA praktizierten handelspolitischen Unilateralismus in Gestalt des «301-Verfahrens» ersetzen könnten. Mit anderen Worten: Wäre es möglich, die im Rahmen von «301-Verfahren» bezweckte Öffnung ausländischer Märkte durch ein entschlosseneres Vorgehen gegen private anti-kompetitive Praktiken zu erreichen? Die Verfasser wählen zur Untersuchung dieser Frage folgendes Vorgehen: Zunächst wird die Funktionsweise des «301-Verfahrens» kurz beleuchtet. Anschliessend diskutieren die Autoren die bisherigen «301-Verfahren» und gelangen zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass es hierbei nicht um Wettbewerbsfragen, sondern um die Verbesserung der Absatzchancen von US-Exporteuren geht. Internationale Wettbewerbsregeln stellen somit kein «Gegengift» gegen das «301-Verfahren» dar. Darüber hinaus wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass der US-Unilateralismus nicht als verkappter Protektionismus, sondern als ein wirksames Mittel zur (multilateralen) Marktöffnung anzusehen ist.
   
   
   Comments of David Palmeter: Competition Policy and «Unfair» Trade: First Do. No Harm.