Special Issue "Decision Rules in the European Union - A Rational Choice Perspective" The following articles were published in this special issue of Aussenwirtschaft. Part I: Horizontal Interaction Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit Georg Tsebelis The chapter compares the power of the different institutional actors of the EU (Council Commission and European Parliament) under the cooperation and codecision procedures. A series of spatial models enables the reader to evaluate the influence of each one of these three actors in the legislative process. The conclusions are that: 1. The Commission's power to set the agenda is unambiguously reduced by codecision. 2. The relationship between Council and Parliament becomes more ambiguous, since the ability of the EP to affect institutional decisions increases (through the veto power introduced by the codecision procedure), but its ability to influence policy decisions (through conditional agenda setting introduced by the cooperation procedure) is reduced. The paper makes the prediction that the role of the European Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes between the Council and the EP will be reduced, because each one of these actors has now the power to block European decisionmaking independently, and so, resolve the disputes politically. The Benefits of the Conciliation Procedure for the European Parliament: Comment to George Tsebelis Peter Moser [to be added] Policy Making and Commission Appointment in the European Union Christophe Crombez The author presents spatial models of Commission appointment and EU policy making. The theory characterizes sets of effective Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully propose their own ideal policies, and sets of successful proposals, i.e., proposals that can become EU policy. It also determines equilibrium EU Commissions and policies. The paper focuses on the Commission's role in EU policy making and discusses how recent institutional developments have affected its powers. It concludes that the Parliament's increased role in Commission appointment and policy making has limited the sets of effective Commissions and the sets of successful proposals. The Commission as a Pawn to the Member Countries: Comment to Christophe Crombez Simon Hug Beyond comitology: a comparative analysis of implementation procedures with parliamentary involvement Bernhard Steunenberg, Christian Kobold and Dieter Schmidtchen While the European Parliament currently plays an important role in the European legislative process, it is not yet involved in the decision making process on the implementation of measures. The Council still plays a dominant role at this stage of the European policy making process. Based on the current decision making procedures, which are commonly known as 'comitology', the Council and thereby the member states are allowed to review the Commission's execution of Community acts. In this paper we propose and analyze two alternative implementation procedures, which may strengthen the role of Parliament. The policies which these procedures may produce are compared with those of current procedures. Moreover, we show how the institutional balance in the Union would change if the alternative procedures were implemented. Redistribution and the Power Struggle within the European Union: Comment to Bernhard Steunenberg, Christian Kobold and Dieter Schmidtchen Gerald Schneider Part II: Vertical Integration European Union Power and Regional Involvement: A Case Study of the Political Implications of the Reform of the Structural Funds for Ireland Diane Payne, Robert Mokken and Frans Stokman The Reform of the Structural Funds process in Ireland, has the potential over time, to curtail the power of the national central public authorities, while increasing the political effectiveness of other actors. This policy process comprises a chain of collective decision making processes around important issues. These issues belong to different policy arenas, called the national and subnational policy arenas. The policy outcomes in the different arenas are determined by the interplay of stakeholders with varying capabilities, policy preferences and saliences. Subnational level actors in Ireland, have become more effective over time in the subnational policy arena, but remain excluded from the national policy arena. However, the European Commission Directorate General XVI for Regional policy has emerged over time, as the most central actor in both arenas. The Role of the Regions and the 'Partnership Principle' in the Structural Policy,Comment to Diane Payne, Robert Mokken and Frans Stokman René Buholzer [to be added] Political Accountability in an Economic and Monetary Union Susanne Lohmann When states form a political union, the responsibility for economic policy outcomes - inflation and output growth - is diffused across multiple policymakers. As a result, the contributions made by individual policymakers are subject to less intense voter scrutiny. This article examines the policy and welfare consequences of reduced political accountability. I show that the average quality of policymakers is lower in a political union. However, their incentive to manipulate monetary policy is reduced in a union. Therefore, positive effects on welfare are possible. Political Pressures on the Future European Central Bank: Comment to Susanne Lohmann Robert Holzmann [to be added] Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis Patrick Dunleavy The progressive centralization of the European Union is analysed using an array of public choice models, operating at the levels of social forces and institutional actors, and covering both the supply of centralization and the demand for it. The 'triple state thesis' argues that largescale business systematically seeks to insulate decisions of key importance for profit levels from electoral scrutiny. A welfaremaximizing approach argues that European citizens have accepted changes in the level at which decisions are made in order to accomplish goals more efficiently, by matching institutional scales to problem characteristics. In the bureaushaping model, EU bureaucrats have played a key role by wanting to deliver centralization while maintaining a minimal organizational apparatus. And the transaction costs account sets out why member state governments have incentives to delegate (partial) powers upwards, in order to achieve deniability for tough decisions and to facilitate otherwise difficult precommitments. Two key implications flow from the overall analysis: the drift to Brussels' is likely to continue; and the EU's 'democratic deficit' will be a permanent feature of institutional arrangements. Supply and Demand Factors of Centralization, Comment to Patrick Dunleavy Gebhard Kirchgässner Part III: Discussions of Selected Reform Proposals Government Formation in the European Parliament Michael Laver This chapter looks at some political implications of a potential institutional reform in the EU - giving the European Parliament the power to choose a political executive for the Union. It applies two different models of government formation - the dynamic model of protocoalition formation, and the portfolio allocation model - and implements these using party positions derived from an expert survey. Whichever model is used, the conclusions are that members of the liberal party group would be in the pivotal position in the consequent government formation process. This conclusion holds even if what is at present quite a diverse group, in terms of the policy positions of member parties, were to be reduced to its ideological "core" members as a result of the politics of government formation. Should the European Parliament be Given the Power to Elect the Commission? Comment to Michael Laver Dennis C. Mueller The Power of Political Parties in the Institutions of the European Union Josep M. Colomer and Madeleine O. Hösli Voting power analyses as applied to the European Union (EU) have usually focused on a single institution, such as the Council of the EU or the European Parliament (EP) and measure a priori voting power, valid over longer time spans and assuming several coalitions between members to be likely, rather than the distribution of power at a specific point of time. This paper attempts to demonstrate how "actual voting power" can be assessed on the basis of two modifications: (1) the paper provides an overall index of voting power for political parties as re-presented in the institutions of the EU, mainly the Council and the EP; (2) for the case of the EP - in contrast to the Council - it is assumed that only "connected coalitions" form and power in the Council is assumed to be sha-red by the respective domestic governing parties. Technically, the analysis is based on a modification of the (normalized) Banzhaf power index. Under this approach, the national government parties in the five largest EU member states - Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain - are found to be the most powerful political actors within the EU institutions as of present. For the situation at the end of 1996, this is especially true for the British Conservatives, the German Christian-Democrats and the Spanish Popular Party. In addition, the British Labour Party and the Forza Italia, two major national opposition parties, appear to be particularly power-ful in negotiating a political majority within the EU institutions. The Power Index Method and the European Union: Comment to Josep M. Colomer and Madeleine O. Hösli Jan-Erik Lane, Sven Berg and Reinert Maeland [to be added] Integration through Referendums? Simon Hug Instruments of direct democracy have been considered both as hurdles to integration and as facilitating factors for integration. In the context of European Integration referendums are even envisioned as possible solutions to the "democratic deficit." The insights from the literature on referendums do not allow, however, the role of direct democracy in processes of integration to be judged. In the present paper I explore with game theoretic tools the likely consequences of ratification referendums in an integration process. I show that referendums are likely to increase the legitimity of decisions but that the leeway for treaty revisions becomes smaller and integration may become more fragmented. Referenda ('Voice') and Tiebout Competition ('Exit') As Means of Integration? Comment to Simon Hug Lars P. Feld [to be added]